I mages of the great influenza pandemics of the past are replete with crowded hospitals the size of aircraft hangars, along with armed guards protecting healthcare workers (HCWs). It is hardly something of which the current generation have any direct memory. These images are more like fiction than recent history, but the vision of a UK pandemic in our near future is not fantasy. Scenarios of more than a million sick, infected patients with mortalities varying from 25-50% have been produced, and it is not surprising that the WHO states on its website that "economic and social disruption will be severe and that large numbers of deaths will occur."
The arrival of such a pandemic will produce ethical challenges to the way that health care is delivered and managed in the UK, of the sort not seen for decades. One does not have to envision an apocalyptic event to realise how problematical managing a pandemic would be. This government has trumpeted, for good reason, a health service that is designed to respond to individual needs and demands, and we enjoy a society that has become accustomed to an individually focused healthcare system. Even conservative modelling suggests that during a pandemic there would be 14 million infected patients in the UK. 1 A proportion of these will require hospitalisation and a proportion of those hospitalised will compete for scarce intensive care beds. If a pandemic occurs, the fact that ICU beds will be scarce is certain. 2 What is also certain is that staff shortages will occur. 1 The Department of Health has produced an 'Ethical framework for a response to pandemic 'flu.' 3 The framework contains a re-statement of some basic principles of health care, along with some jolly nice sentiments, none of which are controversial and all of which are somewhat obvious. One would hope that one would have practised within this framework in any event. From an intensive care point of view, however, it does not provide any concrete guidance of help to a doctor on the frontline. This paper discusses problematic ethical issues which will occur.
Modification of healthcare standards -making decisions
In a pre-pandemic situation, the UK NHS provides free access to health care for eligible residents. The healthcare system seeks to responds to patients' healthcare needs, and for the most part such needs are capable of being met. Perhaps just as importantly, patients have the capacity to benefit from the healthcare supplied. Limitations on healthcare provision are often dictated by cost-effective analysis, as often produced by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). Thus, whilst health care is patient-centred and considers individual choice, it does so in the context of resource allocation that has a 'maximising benefit,' or utilitarian, component. Nonetheless, the principles of equality and fairness predominate in our egalitarian system. Would this system change in a pandemic?
It is difficult to imagine the NHS functioning as it does now, under the conditions of a pandemic. In a peak week, up to 4.5 million cases might emerge, and an estimated 50,000 patients might need intensive care if 'normal care' (clinically appropriate by current standards) was to be offered. In the UK, there are fewer than 5,000 intensive care beds. Even with conservative estimates of demand for beds being only four to five times that available, the numbers simply do not stack up. There would have to be significant changes in how health care is provided simply to avoid complete meltdown. However much one talks about treating people with concern and respect and of being fair, the treasured values of our national health system, the outcome will be restriction of access to intensive care for some individuals. This will entail a denial of potential life-saving treatment on a scale far greater than that seen in any previous winter bed shortage. An appeal to many ethical concepts, from virtue ethics to deontology, will provide a guide as to what healthcare professionals should do under these circumstances, but none will provide 'the answer' to all circumstances.
The DH steering committee has commented that only the individual can decide how much life is worth to him or her. This is most certainly true, but it hardly helps decisionmaking, as few patients will decline care if offered even if they are in a fit state to do so, and one cannot imagine relatives declining treatment for their loved one. How, then, can clinicians decide who gets the bed? Faced with limited resources, perhaps the most morally coherent policy would be to direct care to those who would have a capacity to benefit in the context of maximising lives saved. In the intensive care context, this would mean choosing patients who would be most likely to survive to discharge. This is a similar ethic to triage in emergencies; one does not rush to treat wounds that are clearly fatal, passing by a person with survivable wounds. To ignore the plight of those who could survive and treat those who cannot is a moral wrong, especially in a situation of limited resources. This, in an ethical sense, is attempting to meet an unmeetable need. In situations of limited resources, the scale and scope of needs must by definition be reduced. This modification of healthcare provision will also have knockon effects into non-pandemic areas. If available ICU beds are being used for patients with respiratory failure, then they will not be available for any other use. There will thus be an
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'opportunity cost' (an economic term, meaning the cost of making one decision on another person). If I allocate this bed to a patient with respiratory failure, it will not be available for routine major surgery, which will then not go ahead, making such a decision even more complex.
Aside from the capacity to benefit discussed above, there are many postulated mechanisms for making such decisions. One of these is the 'fair innings' argument, that directs care to the younger as they have more years to go. The fundamental principle is that once you have had your fair innings of life, say 70 or 80 years, then any more is a bonus. This is, of course, implicitly ageist and has consequently been rejected by the DH' s working party. However, faced with a drowning child and a drowning adult, to whom would we throw the lifebelt, if only one was available? I suspect most would throw to the child, but if you, the reader, were the adult, would you wish it to be that way? You could rightly question the morality of another person making that decision. A similar mechanism is assessing the QALY, 4 the quality-adjusted life-year. The QALY argument looks at how many, and how good, are the years to be gained by an intervention. QALY analysis is used extensively in health economics; it suffers from the criticism of, again, being ageist and is also possibly discriminatory against the disabled.
Emmanuel and Wertheimer 5 have described, in the context of a pandemic, a 'life-cycle principle,' which gives priority to adolescence and early middle age. It has some moral plausibility, but the chances of a policy that is discriminatory to the old and the very young at the same time, being accepted in the UK would seem remote. Nicholas Richer 6 described five factors which might be applied to the allocation of life-saving therapy. The first two, those of likelihood of success and of expectancy of future life, would seem uncontroversial. More controversially, he went on to add factors of family role (responsibilities to children, etc.) and of merit, the latter being divided into past services to society and possible future services to society.
Using the analogy above, it is like deciding to throw the lifebelt to either Einstein or the milkman, or the future Einstein or milkman. This concept of social utility as a means for deciding priority in health care would conflict with the basic ideals of the NHS of equality and fairness. It is doubtful whether we would ever, short of Armageddon, have to make such decisions, although it would be naïve to imagine that in a pandemic, healthcare provision for cabinet ministers would be the same as for the rest of us. All decision-making systems have problems. It is clear that decisions will have to be made, but no one system is perfect; indeed we cannot hope to find an optimal system to make such decisions as there are no perfectly correct answers in ethics. Perhaps the only completely fair way we could allocate beds would be to either offer no intensive care to anybody or to merely allocate beds randomly.
Of great importance is by whom and when should these decisions be made. Clearly, many decisions will be made at the bedside; but it seems sensible to have clear transparent strategies in position in advance so that admission criteria are known and, more importantly, adhered to except in exceptional circumstances. Trust clinical ethics committees may help in deciding such priorities. If protocols and decisions are in place in advance, then individuals working in an acute situation are less likely to be 'blamed' for not providing care. This has implications for personal security and is discussed below.
Ethics of healthcare workers -going to work?
In considering provision of health care in a pandemic we assume that doctors will turn up for work. Doctors and other healthcare professionals have a duty of care -but how far does this extend? In this situation there is a dilemma. Going to work involves a risk of infection, and with that carries the risk of infecting immediate family at home. It has been called 'going to work once,' for once in the institution and exposed to the risk of infection some may choose to stay there -but where would they stay? Similar issues have been raised before in relation to the SARS epidemic. In 2003, Peter Singer' s group, analysing the response to SARS in Toronto, commented that they 'could not reach consensus on the issue of duty to care, particularly regarding the extent to which healthcare workers are obligated to risk their lives in delivering clinical care. This issue requires urgent attention from researchers, regulatory bodies, and the public. 6, 7 How much do healthcare workers have to put themselves at risk before their obligations become conditional? Can exposing oneself to the risk of an infection with a high mortality rate qualify as a normal work activity? An AMA policy document (2004) clearly stipulates such a commitment:
'National, regional, and local responses to epidemics, terrorist attacks, and other disasters require extensive involvement of physicians. Because of their commitment to care for the sick and injured, individual physicians have an obligation to provide urgent medical care during disasters. This ethical obligation holds even in the face of greater than usual risks to their own safety, health or life. The physician workforce, however, is not an unlimited resource; therefore, when participating in disaster responses, physicians should balance immediate benefits to individual patients with ability to care for patients in the future.' 8 The statement is laudable, but how does an individual or a manager decide when they might have more benefit in the future? Most HCWs would agree with the principle, but there must however be reciprocity for them. In the event of a fullscale pandemic there exists the possibility, acknowledged by national governments and the WHO, for civil disturbance. In the context of restricted access to health care there is a risk to HCWs from members of the public. Governments must ensure adequate safety for those at the 'front line,' particularly those making acute decisions. When faced with the threat of violence from angry members of the public, healthcare workers are ethically justified in protecting themselves first, not just for themselves but also for their families and future patients. In this context the early vaccination if possible of HCWs and prophylactic use of pharmacotherapy for them and for their families seems morally justifiable.
Medico-legal issues
Whether we like it or not, we live in a world where the death of a patient is often perceived as a failure. Failure implies wrongdoing and the idea that something 'went wrong' produces a desire to blame. This, combined with overexpectations of what can be done, probably fuelled by misleading television medical dramas, 9 has led to a blame culture and litigiousness. This poses problems when combined with the inevitable denial of potential life-saving therapy. How should this be addressed? It seems prudent to suggest that, in the event of a pandemic, the footing of our NHS should change to a state of emergency, where alterations in standards of care are implemented by designated authorities with the backing of relevant professional bodies. Staff working in these extreme conditions need to know that when they make decisions in settings of adversity, that have been called 'tragic choices', that they do not expose themselves to risk of inappropriate litigation and ungrounded complaints down the track. We would need people to make these decisions. The DH guidance mentions accountability, that those making decisions can be held to account for 'the decisions they do or don't take for which they are responsible.' 3 This seems perfectly reasonable, but few have any experience of making such decisions, and if we have a National Health Service should we not have national guidelines and shared responsibility in the face of a collective threat? Or will it be in the end that the individual doctor on the ground will bear all responsibility? The DH guidance talks of reciprocity, supporting staff with increased burdens. These burdens may be more than physical.
Summary
The minefield of pandemic flu and intensive care presents challenges for clinicians, ethicists, managers, politicians and security staff. Whilst one should not produce unnecessary concern about avian 'flu by presenting doomsday scenarios, keeping things in proportion as advised by the DH also involves accepting that things could become very difficult indeed. Making choices about who gets the ICU bed is not going to be easy, and presents ethical dilemmas for clinicians on the ground. Making those choices may put healthcare staff at risk from relatives, on top of the very real risks involved in working with infectious patients in a climate of inadequate security. We must make decisions about access on sound ethical grounds, in a morally just fashion. As important as that is, if healthcare staff are to make the ethical decision to stay at work and expose themselves to risk, then those responsible for their safety have an ethical obligation to protect and support them both during a pandemic but also afterwards. Reciprocity works both ways!
